-
Sat Dec 22 2018 Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com> [4.1.12-94.8.10.el7uek]
- xen-swiotlb: use actually allocated size on check physical continuous (Joe Jin) [Orabug: 29056810]
- xen-swiotlb: fix the check condition for xen_swiotlb_free_coherent (Joe Jin) [Orabug: 29056771]
- IB/mad: Use ID allocator routines to allocate agent number (Hans Westgaard Ry) [Orabug: 28863402]
-
Fri Dec 07 2018 Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com> [4.1.12-94.8.9.el7uek]
- block: fix bdi vs gendisk lifetime mismatch (Shan Hai) [Orabug: 29006875]
- Revert commit 6598effa6b59 ("block: fix bdi vs gendisk lifetime mismatch") (Ashish Samant) [Orabug: 28993749]
-
Tue Nov 20 2018 Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com> [4.1.12-94.8.8.el7uek]
- block: fix bdi vs gendisk lifetime mismatch (Dan Williams) [Orabug: 28873755]
-
Mon Aug 06 2018 Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com> [4.1.12-94.8.6.el7uek]
- fs: proc: array.c: fix Speculation_Store_Bypass print format (Mihai Carabas) [Orabug: 28450089]
- x86/speculation: Support per-process SSBD with IBRS (Alexandre Chartre) [Orabug: 28354045]
- x86/speculation: Implement per-cpu IBRS control (Alexandre Chartre) [Orabug: 28354040]
- x86/bugs/IBRS: Keep SSBD mitigation in effect if spectre_v2=ibrs is selected (Mihai Carabas)
- kernel: sys.c: missing break for prctl spec ctrl (Mihai Carabas) [Orabug: 28444780]
- x86/bugs: Rename SSBD_NO to SSB_NO (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 28444726] {CVE-2018-3639}
- KVM: SVM: Implement VIRT_SPEC_CTRL support for SSBD (Tom Lendacky) [Orabug: 28444726] [Orabug: 28069548] {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/speculation, KVM: Implement support for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL/LS_CFG (Thomas Gleixner) [Orabug: 28444726] {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic (Thomas Gleixner) [Orabug: 28444726] {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs: Expose x86_spec_ctrl_base directly (Thomas Gleixner) [Orabug: 28444726] {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs: Unify x86_spec_ctrl_{set_guest,restore_host} (Borislav Petkov) [Orabug: 28444726] {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/speculation: Rework speculative_store_bypass_update() (Thomas Gleixner) [Orabug: 28444726] {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support (Tom Lendacky) [Orabug: 28444726] {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs, KVM: Extend speculation control for VIRT_SPEC_CTRL (Thomas Gleixner) [Orabug: 28444726] {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/speculation: Handle HT correctly on AMD (Thomas Gleixner) [Orabug: 28444726] {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN (Thomas Gleixner) [Orabug: 28444726] {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/cpu/AMD: Fix erratum 1076 (CPB bit) (Borislav Petkov) [Orabug: 28444726] {CVE-2018-3639}
- KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static (Jiri Kosina) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type (Jiri Kosina) {CVE-2018-3639}
- Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups (Borislav Petkov) {CVE-2018-3639}
- proc: Use underscores for SSBD in 'status' (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass (Kees Cook) {CVE-2018-3639}
- seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
- seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation (Kees Cook) {CVE-2018-3639}
- seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
- prctl: Add force disable speculation (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- seccomp: Enable speculation flaw mitigations (Kees Cook) {CVE-2018-3639}
- proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations (Kees Cook) {CVE-2018-3639}
- nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task (Kees Cook) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs/IBRS: Disable SSB (RDS) if IBRS is sslected for spectre_v2. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86: thread_info.h: move RDS from index 5 to 23 (Mihai Carabas) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
- prctl: Add speculation control prctls (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/cpu/intel: Add Knights Mill to Intel family (Piotr Luc) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/cpu: Rename Merrifield2 to Moorefield (Andy Shevchenko) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs/IBRS: Warn if IBRS is enabled during boot. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs/IBRS: Use variable instead of defines for enabling IBRS (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting into a separate function (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/bugs/IBRS: Turn on IBRS in spectre_v2_select_mitigation (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
- x86/msr: Add SPEC_CTRL_IBRS.. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
-
Wed Jul 11 2018 Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com> [4.1.12-94.8.5.el7uek]
- mlx4_core: restore optimal ICM memory allocation (Eric Dumazet) [Orabug: 27718304]
- mlx4_core: allocate ICM memory in page size chunks (Qing Huang) [Orabug: 27718304]
-
Sat May 05 2018 Chuck Anderson <chuck.anderson@oracle.com> [4.1.12-94.8.4.el7uek]
- Revert "mlx4: change the ICM table allocations to lowest needed size" (Håkon Bugge) [Orabug: 27971820]
-
Wed Apr 25 2018 Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com> [4.1.12-94.8.3.el7uek]
- net/rds: ib: Release correct number of frags (Håkon Bugge) [Orabug: 27924178]
- mlx4: change the ICM table allocations to lowest needed size (Daniel Jurgens) [Orabug: 27718304]
- net/rds: Fix incorrect error handling (Håkon Bugge) [Orabug: 27925101]
-
Fri Mar 23 2018 Chuck Anderson <chuck.anderson@oracle.com> [4.1.12-94.8.2.el7uek]
- config: sort out retpoline config options (Brian Maly) [Orabug: 27509502]
- x86: make HAVE_FENTRY dependent on !SIMULATE_GCC44_KABI (Todd Vierling) [Orabug: 27630312]
- kernel: on OL6 only, simulate the gcc 4.4 kABI for __stack_chk_fail() (Todd Vierling) [Orabug: 27509502]
- uek-rpm: configs: Don't set HAVE_FENTRY on OL6 builds. (Todd Vierling) [Orabug: 27509502]
- Revert "x86: make HAVE_FENTRY dependent on !SIMULATE_GCC44_KABI" (Brian Maly) [Orabug: 27630312]
- Revert "Makefile: Build with -Werror=date-time if the compiler supports it" (Gayatri Vasudevan) [Orabug: 27724742]
-
Mon Mar 19 2018 Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com> [4.1.12-94.8.1.el7uek]
- x86/spectre_v2: Fix cpu offlining with IPBP. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- retpoline: selectively disable IBRS in disable_ibrs_and_friends() (Chuck Anderson) [Orabug: 27673499]
- retpoline: move setting of sysctl_ibrs_enabled and sysctl_ibpb_enabled to where SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE and SPEC_CTRL_IBPB_INUSE are set (Chuck Anderson) [Orabug: 27672521]
- retpoline: set IBRS and IBPB in use only on the boot CPU call to init_scattered_cpuid_features() (Chuck Anderson) [Orabug: 27672521]
- retpoline: display IBPB feature status along with IBRS status (Chuck Anderson) [Orabug: 27672521]
- retpoline: move lock/unlock of spec_ctrl_mutex to check_modinfo() (Chuck Anderson) [Orabug: 27672521]
- retpoline: call clear_retpoline_fallback() with boot parm spectre_v2_heuristics=off (Chuck Anderson) [Orabug: 27672521]
- retpoline: add brackets to check_ibrs_inuse() and clear_ibpb_inuse() (Chuck Anderson) [Orabug: 27672521]
- retpoline/module: do not enable IBRS/IPBP if SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_ADMIN_DISABLED/SPEC_CTRL_IBPB_ADMIN_DISABLED is set (Chuck Anderson) [Orabug: 27547729]
- retpoline: microcode incorrectly reported as broken during early boot (Chuck Anderson) [Orabug: 27672521]
- retpoline: move lock/unlock of spec_ctrl_mutex into init_scattered_cpuid_features() (Chuck Anderson) [Orabug: 27672521]
- KVM: Disable irq while unregistering user notifier (Ignacio Alvarado)
- x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630399]
- Revert "x86/spec_ctrl: Add 'nolfence' knob to disable fallback for spectre_v2 mitigation" (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630379]
- Revert "x86/spec: Add 'lfence_enabled' in sysfs" (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- x86/spectre_v2: Fix the documentation to say the right thing. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- x86/spectre_v2: Don't check bad microcode versions when running under hypervisors. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630364]
- x86/ia32/syscall: RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS when returning from syscall (Ankur Arora) [Orabug: 27630345] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/ia32/syscall: don't do RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS prematurely (Ankur Arora) [Orabug: 27630345] {CVE-2017-5715}
- trace: declare blk_add_trace_rq non-static on OL6 (Todd Vierling) [Orabug: 27630338]
- x86/spectre: move microcode check before kernel ibrs flags are set (Daniel Jordan) [Orabug: 27630331] {CVE-2017-5715}
- bonding: attempt to better support longer hw addresses (Jarod Wilson) [Orabug: 27630325]
- x86: make HAVE_FENTRY dependent on !SIMULATE_GCC44_KABI (Todd Vierling) [Orabug: 27630312]
- retpoline/module: fall back to another spectre mitigation when disabling retpoline (Chuck Anderson) [Orabug: 27630299]
- retpoline/module: add bit defs for use_ibpb (Chuck Anderson) [Orabug: 27630299]
- x86/spectre_v2: Only use IBRS when ibrs_inuse tells us to (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- x86/spectre_v2: Disable IBRS if spectre_v2=off (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL (KarimAllah Ahmed) [Orabug: 27630289]
- x86/spectre_v2: Remove 0xc2 from spectre_bad_microcodes (Darren Kenny) [Orabug: 27630283]
- x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch (Tim Chen) [Orabug: 27630273]
- x86/entry: RESTORE_IBRS needs to be done under kernel CR3 (Ankur Arora) [Orabug: 27630254]
- Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL (redux) (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre_v2: Add spectre_v2_heuristics= (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre_v2: Do not disable IBPB when disabling IBRS (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/scattered: Fix the order. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre: Favor IBRS on Skylake over retpoline (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL (Darren Kenny) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre: Now that we expose 'stbibp' make sure it is correct. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg (Borislav Petkov) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/nospec: Fix header guards names (Borislav Petkov) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre_v2: Don't spam the console with these: (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/cpu: Keep model defines sorted by model number (Andy Shevchenko) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre_v2: Print what options are available. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre_v2: Add VMEXIT_FILL_RSB instead of RETPOLINE (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre: If IBRS is enabled disable "Filling RSB on context switch" (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- KVM: VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre_v2: Don't allow {ibrs,ipbp,lfence}_enabled to be toggled if retpoline (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre: Fix retpoline_enabled (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre: Update sysctl values if toggled only by set_{ibrs,ibpb}_disabled (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- retpoline/module: Taint kernel for missing retpoline in module (Andi Kleen) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/retpoline: Fill RSB on context switch for affected CPUs (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB (Andi Kleen) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk (Masami Hiramatsu) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes (Masami Hiramatsu) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk (Masami Hiramatsu) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected (Thomas Gleixner) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- kbuild: modversions for EXPORT_SYMBOL() for asm (Nicholas Piggin) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/retpoline: Add LFENCE to the retpoline/RSB filling RSB macros (Tom Lendacky) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/retpoline: Remove compile time warning (Thomas Gleixner) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps (Andi Kleen) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre_v2: Add disable_ibrs_and_friends (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre_v2: Figure out if STUFF_RSB macro needs to be used. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre_v2: Figure out when to use IBRS. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre: Add IBRS option. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- kconfig.h: use __is_defined() to check if MODULE is defined (Masahiro Yamada) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- EXPORT_SYMBOL() for asm (Al Viro) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/asm: Make asm/alternative.h safe from assembly (Andy Lutomirski) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/kbuild: enable modversions for symbols exported from asm (Adam Borowski) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value (Andrey Ryabinin) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/mm/32: Move setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID) earlier (Andy Lutomirski) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/alternatives: Add missing '
' at end of ALTERNATIVE inline asm (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking (Borislav Petkov) [Orabug: 27630250] {CVE-2017-5715}
- x86/microcode/intel: Extend BDW late-loading with a revision check (Jia Zhang) [Orabug: 27629973]
- x86/microcode/intel: Disable late loading on model 79 (Borislav Petkov) [Orabug: 27629973]
- x86/spec: Fix spectre_v1 bug and mitigation indicators (John Haxby) [Orabug: 27630236]
- x86: Fix compile issues if CONFIG_XEN not defined (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- x86/mitigation/spectre_v2: Add reporting of 'lfence' (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- x86/spec: Add 'lfence_enabled' in sysfs (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- x86/spec_ctrl: Add 'nolfence' knob to disable fallback for spectre_v2 mitigation (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- x86/IBRS/IBPB: Remove procfs interface to ibrs/ibpb_enable (Boris Ostrovsky) [Orabug: 27630222]
- x86: Use PRED_CMD MSR when ibpb is enabled (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- x86/IBRS: Drop unnecessary WRITE_ONCE (Boris Ostrovsky) [Orabug: 27630203]
- x86/IBRS: Don't try to change IBRS mode if IBRS is not available (Boris Ostrovsky) [Orabug: 27630203]
- x86/IBRS: Remove support for IBRS_ENABLED_USER mode (Boris Ostrovsky) [Orabug: 27630203]
- x86: Include linux/device.h in bugs_64.c (Boris Ostrovsky) [Orabug: 27630198]
- x86/spectre: Drop the warning about ibrs being obsolete. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- x86/spec: Don't print the Missing arguments for option spectre_v2. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- x86/spec: Also print IBRS if IBPB is disabled. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- x86/IBPB: Provide debugfs interface for changing IBPB mode (Boris Ostrovsky) [Orabug: 27630193]
- x86: Move STUFF_RSB in to the idt macro (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- x86/spec: STUFF_RSB _before_ ENABLE_IBRS (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk)
- x86: Move ENABLE_IBRS in the interrupt macro. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) [Orabug: 27451922]
- x86: Clean up IBRS functionality resident in common code (Kanth Ghatraju) [Orabug: 27445637]
- x86: Display correct settings for the SPECTRE_V2 bug (Kanth Ghatraju) [Orabug: 27445637]
- Set CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES flag (Kanth Ghatraju) [Orabug: 27445637]
- x86/cpu: Implement CPU vulnerabilites sysfs functions (Thomas Gleixner) [Orabug: 27445637]
- sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27445637]
- sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder (Thomas Gleixner) [Orabug: 27445637]
- x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V[12] (David Woodhouse) [Orabug: 27445637]
- x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN (Kanth Ghatraju) [Orabug: 27445637]
-
Fri Mar 16 2018 Brian Maly <brian.maly@oracle.com> [4.1.12-94.7.9.el7uek]
- net/rds: use multiple sge than buddy allocation in congestion code (Wei Lin Guay) [Orabug: 26848749]
- Revert "RDS: fix the sg allocation based on actual message size" (Wei Lin Guay) [Orabug: 26848749]
- Revert "RDS: avoid large pages for sg allocation for TCP transport" (Wei Lin Guay) [Orabug: 26848749]
- Revert "net/rds: Reduce memory footprint in rds_sendmsg" (Wei Lin Guay) [Orabug: 26848749]
- net/rds: reduce memory footprint during ib_post_recv in IB transport (Wei Lin Guay) [Orabug: 26848749]
- net/rds: reduce memory footprint during rds_sendmsg with IB transport (Wei Lin Guay) [Orabug: 26848749]
- net/rds: set the rds_ib_init_frag based on supported sge (Wei Lin Guay) [Orabug: 26848749]